discrete Tao

In this specific chapter Tart defines and describes in a more detailed way the discrete states of consciousness:

Discrete States of Consciousness

The terms state of consciousness and altered state of consciousness have become very popular. As a consequence of popularization, however, the terms are frequently used in such a loose fashion as to mean almost nothing in particular. Many people now use the phrase state of consciousness, for example, to mean simply whatever is one one's mind. So if I pick up a water tumbler and look at it, I am in "water tumbler state of consciousness," and if I now touch my typewriter, I am in "typewriter state of consciousness." Then an altered state of consciousness simply means that what one is thinking about or experiencing now is different from what it was a moment ago.

To rescue the concepts of state of consciousness and altered state of consciousness for more precise scientific use, I introduce the terms and abbreviation discrete state of consciousness (d-SoC) and discrete state of consciousness (d-ASC). I discussed the basic theoretical concepts for defining these crucial terms. Here, I first describe certain kinds of experiential data that led to the concepts of discrete states and then go on to a formal definition of d-SoC and d-ASC.

Mapping Experience

Suppose that an individual's experience (and/or behavior and/or physiology) can be adequately described at any given moment if we know all the important dimensions along which experience varies and can assess the exact point along each dimension that an individual occupies or experiences at a given moment. Each dimension may be the level of functioning of a psychological structure or process. We presume that we have a multidimensional map of psychological space and that by knowing exactly where the individual is in that psychological space we have adequately described his experiential reality for that given time. This is generally accepted theoretical idea, but it is very difficult to apply in practice because many psychological dimensions may be important for understanding an individual's experience at any given moment. We may be able to assess only a small number of them, and/or an individual's position on some of these dimensions may change even as we are assessing the value of others. Nevertheless, the theory is an ideal to be worked toward, and we can assume for purposes of discussion that we can adequately map experience.

To simplify further, let us assume that what is important about an individual's experiences can be mapped on only two dimensions. We can thus draw a graph, like Figure 5-1:

Each small circle represents an observation at a single point in time of where a particular individual is in this two-dimensional psychological space. In this example, we have taken a total of twenty-two binary measures at various times.

The first thing that strikes us about this individual is that his experiences seem to fall in three distinct clusters and that there are large gaps between these three distinct clusters. Within each cluster this individual shows a certain amount of variability, but he has not had any experiences at all at points outside the defined clusters. This kind of clustering in the plot of an individual's locations at various times in experiential space is what I mean by discrete states of consciousness. Put another way, it means that you can be in a certain region of experiential space and show some degree of movement or variation within that space, but to transit out of that space you have to cross a "forbidden zone" where you cannot function and/or cannot have experiences and/or cannot be conscious of having experiences; then you find yourself in a discretely different experiential space. It is the quantum principle of physics applied to psychology. You can be either here or there, but not in between.

There are transitional periods between some d-SoCs; they are dealt with in more detail later. For now, being in a d-SoC means that you are in one of the three distinct regions of psychological space shown in Figure 5-1.

Now let us concretize this example. Let us call the vertical dimension ability to image or hallucinate, varying from a low of imaging something outside yourself but with nothing corresponding in intensity to a sensory perception, to a high or imagining something with all the qualities of reality, of actual sensory perception. Let us call the horizontal dimension ability to be rational, to think in accordance with the rules of some logic. We are not now concerned with the cultural arbitrariness of logic, but simply take it as a given set of rules. This dimension varies from a low of making many mistakes in the application of this logic, as on days when you feel rather stupid and have a hard time expressing yourself, to a high of following the rules of the logic perfectly, when you feel sharp and your mind works like a precision computer.

We can assign names of known d-SoCs to the three clusters of data points in the graph. Ordinary consciousness (for our culture) is shown in the lower right-hand corner. It is characterized by a high degree of rationality and a relatively/ low degree of imaging ability. We can usually think without making many mistakes in logic, and our imaginings usually contain mild sensory qualities, but they are far less intense than sensory perceptions. Notice again that there is variability within the state we call ordinary consciousness. Logic may be more or less accurate, ability to image may vary somewhat, but this all stays in a range that we recognize as ordinary, habitual, or normal.

At the opposite extreme, we have all experienced a region of psychological space where rationality is usually very low indeed, while ability to image is quite high. This is ordinary nocturnal dreaming, where we create (image) the entire dream world. It seems sensorily real. Yet we often take considerable liberties with rationality.

The third cluster of data points defines a particularly interesting d-SoC, lucid dreaming. This is the special kind of dream named by the Dutch physician Frederick Van Eeden, in which you feel as if you have awakened in terms of mental functioning within the dream world: you feel as rational and in control of your mental state as in your ordinary d-SoC, but you are still experientially located within the dream world. Here both range of rationality and range of ability to image are at a very high level.

Figure 5-1 deliberately depicts rationality in ordinary nocturnal dreaming as lower than rationality in the ordinary d-SoC. But some nocturnal dreams seem very rational for prolonged periods, not only at the time but by retrospectively applied waking state standards. So the cluster shown for nocturnal dreaming should perhaps be oval and extend into the upper right region of the graph, overlapping with the lucid dreaming cluster. This would have blurred the argument about distinct regions of experiential space, so the graph was not drawn that way. The point is not that there is never any overlap in functioning for a particular psychological dimension between two d-SoCs (to the contrary, all the ones we know much about do share many features in common), but that a complete multidimensional mapping of the important dimensions of experiential space shows this distinct clustering. While a two-dimensional plot may show apparent identity or overlap between two d-SoCs, a three-dimensional or N-dimensional map would show their discreteness. this is important, for d-SoCs are not just quantitative variation on one or more continua (as Figure 5-1 implies), but qualitative, pattern-changing, system-functioning differences.

A d-SoC, then, refers to a particular region of experiential space, as shown in Figure 5-1, and adding the descriptive adjective altered simply means that with respect to some state of consciousness (usually the ordinary state) as a baseline, we have made the quantum jump to another region of experiential space, the d-ASC.The quantum jump may be both quantitative, in the sense that structures function at higher or lower levels of intensity, and qualitative, in the sense that structures in the baseline state may cease to function, previously latent structures may begin to function, and the system pattern may change. To use a computer analogy, going from one d-SoC to a d-ASC is like putting a radically different program into the computer, the mind. The graphic presentation of Figure 5-1 cannot express qualitative changes, but they are at least as important or more important than the quantitative changes.

Figures 5-2 and 5-3 illustrate the qualitative pattern difference between two d-SoCs. Various psychological structures are show connected information and energy flows into a pattern in different ways. The latent pattern, the discrete altered state of consciousness with respect to the other, is shown in lighter lines on each figure. The two states share some structures/functions in common, yet, their organization are distinctly different.

Figure 5-2. Representation of a d-SoC as a pattern of energy/awareness flow interrelating various human potentials. Lighter lines show a possible d-ASC pattern.

Figure 5-3. Representation of a d-ASC as a reorganization of information and energy flow pattern and an altered selection of potentials. The b-SoC is shown in lighter lines.

Figures 5-2 and 5-3 express what William James meant when he wrote:

Our ordinary waking consciousness... is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are all there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question—for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness.

It is important to stress that the pattern differences are the essential defining element of different d-SoCs. Particular psychological functions may be identical to several d-SoCs, but the overall system functioning is quite different. People still speak English whether they are in their ordinary waking state, drunk with alcohol, stoned on marijuana, or dreaming; yet, we would hardly call these states identical because the same language is spoken in all.

Definition of a Discrete State of Consciousness

We can define a d-SoC for a given individual as a unique configuration or system of psychological structures or subsystems. The structures vary in the way they process information, or cope, or affect experiences within varying environments. The structures operative within a d-SoC make up a system where the operation of the parts, the psychological structures, interact with each other and stabilize each other's functioning by means of feedback control, so that the system, the d-SoC, maintains its overall pattern of functioning in spite of changes in the environment. Thus, the individual parts of the system may vary, but the overall, general configuration of the system remains recognizably the same.

To understand a d-SoC, we must grasp the nature of the parts, the psychological structures/subsystems that compose it, and we must take into account the gestalt properties that arise from the overall system — properties that are not an obvious result of the functioning of the parts. For example, the parts of a car laid out singly on a bench tell me only a little about the nature of the functioning system we call an automobile. Similarly, a list of an individual's traits and skills may tell me little about the pattern that emerges from their organization into a personality, into a "normal" state of consciousness. But understand adequately either the car or the individual, I have to study the whole functioning system itself. To illustrate this, let us go back to the question about whether you are dreaming you are reading this book rather than actually reading it in your ordinary d-SoC. To conclude that what was happening was real (I hope you concluded that!) you may have looked at the functioning of your component structures (my reasoning seems sound, sensory qualities are in the usual range, body image seems right) and decided that since these component structures were operating in the range you associate with your ordinary d-SoC, that was the condition you were in. Or you may have simply felt the gestalt pattern of your functioning, without bothering to check component functions, and instantly recognized it as your ordinary pattern. Either way, you scanned data on the functioning of yourself as a system and categorized the system's mode of functioning as its ordinary one.

Discreteness of States of Consciousness

Let me make a few further points about the discreteness of different states consciousness, the quantum gap between them.

First, the concept of d-SoCs, in its commonsense form, did not come from the kind of precise mapping along psychological dimensions that is sketched in Figure 5-1. Rather, its immediate experiential basis is usually gestalt pattern recognition, the feeling that "this condition of my mind feels radically different from some other condition, rather than just an extension of it." The experiential mapping is a more precise way of saying this.

Second, for most of the d-SoCs we know something about, there has been little or no mapping of the transition from the baseline state of consciousness (b-SoC) to the altered state. Little has been done, for example, in examining the process by which a person passes from an ordinary d-SoC into the hypnotic state, although for most subjects the distinction between the well-developed hypnotic state and their ordinary state is marked. Similarly, when a person begins to smoke marijuana, there is a period during which he is in an ordinary d-SoC and smoking marijuana; only later is he clearly stoned, in the d-ASC we call marijuana intoxication. Joseph Fridgen and I carried out a preliminary survey asking experienced marijuana users about the transition from one state to the other. We found that users almost never bothered to look at the transition: they were either in a hurry to enter the intoxicated state or in a social situation that did not encourage them to observe what was going on in their minds. Similarly, Berke and Hernton reported that the "buzz" that seems to mark this transitional period is easily overlooked by marijuana users.

So, in general for d-SoCs, we do not know the size and exact nature of the quantum jump, or indeed, whether it is possible to effect a continuous transition between two regions of experiential space, thus making them extremes of one state of consciousness rather than two discrete states.

Because the science of consciousness is in its infancy, I am forced to mention too frequently those things we do not know. Let me balance that a little by describing a study that has mapped the transition between two d-SoCs—ordinary waking consciousness and stage 2 sleep. Vogel et al, using electroencephalographic (EEG) indices of the transition from full awakeness (alpha EEG pattern with occasional rapid eye movement, REMs) to full sleep (stage 2 EEG, no eye movements), awoke subjects at various points in the transition process, asked for reports of mental activity just prior to awakening, and asked routine questions about the degree of contact with the environment the subjects felt they had just before awakening. They classified this experiential data into three ego states. In the intact ego state, the content of experience was plausible, fitted consensus reality well, and there was little or no feeling of loss of reality contact. In the destructuralized ego state, content was bizarre and reality contact was impaired or lost. In the restructuralized ego state, contact with reality was lost but the content was plausible by consensus reality standards.

Figure 5-4

Figure 5-4 (from G. Vogel, D. Foulkes, and H. Trosman, Arch. Gen. Psychiat., 1966, 14, 238-248) shows the frequency of these three ego states or states of consciousness with respect to psychophysiological criteria. The psychophysiological criteria are arranged on the horizontal axis in the order in which transition into sleep ordinarily takes place. You can see that the intact ego state is associated with alpha and REM or alpha and SEM (slow eye movement), the destructuralized ego state mainly with stage 1 EEG, and the restructuralized ego state mainly with stage 2 EEG. But there are exceptions in each case. Indeed, a finer analysis of the data shows that the psychological sequence of intact ego — destructuralized ego — restructuralized ego almost always holds in the experiential reports. It is more solid finding than the association of these ego states with particular physiological stage. Some subjects start the intact — destructuralized — restructuralized sequence earlier in the EEG sequence than others. This is a timely reminder that the results of equating psychological states with physiological indicators can be fallacious. But the main thing to note here is the orderliness of the transition sequence from one discrete state to another. This kind of measurement is crude compared with what we need to know, but it is a good start.

The intact ego state and the restructuralized ego state seem to correspond to bounded regions of experiential space, d-SoCs, but it is not clear whether the destructuralized ego state represents a d-SoC or merely a period of unstable transition between the b-SoC of the intact state (ordinary consciousness) and the d-ASC of the restructuralized state (a sleep state). We need more data about the condition they have labeled destructuralized before we can decide whether it meets our criteria for a d-SoC. The later discussions of induction of a d-ASC, transitional phenomena, and the observation of internal states clarify the question we are considering here.

We have now defined a d-SoC for a given individual as a unique configuration of system of psychological structures or subsystems a configuration that maintains its integrity or identity as a recognizable system in spite of variations in input from the environment and in spite of various (small) change in the subsystems. The system, the d-SoC, maintains its identity because various stabilization processes modify subsystem variations so that they do not destroy the integrity of the system.

In closing, I want to add a warning about the finality of the discreteness of any particular d-SoC. Stated that the particular nature of the basic structures underlying the human mind limits their possible interactions and so forms the basis of d-SoCs. Note carefully, however, that many of the structures we deal with in our consciousness, as constructed in our personal growth, are not ultimate structures but compound ones peculiar to our culture, personality, and belief system. I want to emphasize the pragmatic usefulness of a maxim of John Lilly's as a guide to personal and scientific work in this area: "In the province of the mind, what one believe to be true either is true or becomes true within certain limits, to be found experientially and experimentally. These limits are beliefs to be transcended."

Lilly's work comparing the mind to a human biocomputer, as well as his autobiographical accounts of his explorations in consciousness, are essential reading in this area.

balinese Tao

The chinese symbol of Taijitu, expression of the circularity of polar opposites such life and death, is expressed in different ways in other eastern traditions and cultures.

For example in Bali, Indonesia, it is commonly observed drapes with a black and white chequerboard or clothes of the same type worn for ceremonies, to mean the inextricable mixing between opposites.

the system of Tao

The symbol traditionally associated to Tao or, more specifically, to the Teh del Tao - the knowable manifestation of it, is the Taijitu, commonly known as the Ying-Yang symbol, tied to the male/female duality but - more generally- representative of any opposite duality.
The historical association between the symbol and the Taoism, and to its main text - the Tao-Teh-Ching - is not clear, however it represents then completely in its simplest and most synthetic form.
Drawing the symbol can be made by drawing an external circle and two internal circles of half radius, erase the two semicircles on the opposite sides and coloring - usually by white and black - the two remaining parts:

Graphic drawing of the Taijitu symbol.

The symbol represents a polar duality between opposite elements, different and distinct, and describes in general the eastern traditional vision of the polar duality opposed to the western logical one:

Symbolic representation of polar dualities
according to logic western vision (left), intermediate (center) an eastern (right).

In the western vision of classical logic of greek origin, symbolized by the circle to the left, it is drawn a distinction through two opposite and symmetrical elements/processes which, by logical definition, are not mixable and that together describe the totality where the dual distinction is drawn. For example dualities like day/night, negative/positive, war/peace, femminine/masculine and so are composed by opposite elements or processes and completely described the reference context where they apply. The resulting vision is completely static ande binary.
A further improvement starts from the consideration that these dualities are processes, and as such are dynamical; the circle to the middle illustrates a more dynamical vision between the polar opposite processes of the duality.
In the Taijitu symbol the dynamical vision of the polar duality processes and elements reaches at the same time its maximum simplicity and dynamical complexity of representation. Not only the polar processes have a recursive but there's also an interaction between polar processes and elements, shown by the two circular dots internal to the process of opposite sign.
The Taijitu symbol may be considered as a system, and therefore analyzed in its systemic characteristics:

• System elements

They are symbolized by the two internal polar circles placed at the center of the symbol two semicircles, where the corresponding process of opposite sign reaches its maximum amplitude.

• System processes

They are symbolized by the two polar symmetrical recursive polar shapes which together divide the external circle of the symbol. The reppresented dynamic is  è both of process and between processes.

• Processes-elements interaction: system dynamics

The most complex feature of the symbol is the contemporary representation both of polar elements and processes, linked together through a specific dynamic.
At the point where an increasing process reaches its maximum and starts to decrease there's the presence of an element of opposite sign. This type of dynamics may be understood in different ways:
at the peak of its growth a process generates an element of opposite sign;
the presence of an element breaks the opposite sign process growth and makes it decreasing till reset;
lthe presence of an element induces an increasing process of the same sign which reduces the one of opposite sign;

• Process amplitude

To determine the process dynamic is necessary to compute its amplitude as a function of some evolution variable. To define them the following model is used:

Model to compute process amplitude for the Tao symbol.

within the external circle Cext of radius R one draws the red C1 and blue C2 circles with radius R/2. To define a coordinate which is always in the middle of the process the green C3 circle is used with the center moved to the left of R/4 and 3/4R radius. The upper green semicircle defines a radial coordinate which remains always central to the process and that may be assumed as its evolution coordinate s for the upper semicircle of the symbol. For the lower semicircle the central coordinate is a vertical line segment of length R/2 perpendicular to the horizontal axis from the circle C2 center to its border.
The process amplitude may be defined, for any coordinate s=angle*3/4R with angle that varies from 0 to 180 degrees, as the distance between the P1 intersection point of the C3 radius extension withe external circle Cext and the intersection point P2 of the C3 radius with the C1 circle. For any s value in the upper semicircle the P1-P2 segment is perpendicular to C3 and to compute it the sine and cosine theorems are applied on the triangles defined by P1 and P2, where two sides and one angle are known.
For the lower semicircle the amplitude calculation as a function of s is immediate and coincides with a decreasing quarter arc of circle function with radius R/2.
The result for a symbol circle with radius R=1 is:

Process amplitude as a function of evolution for a unitary radius circle.

The process starts from zero, reaches its maximum value R for a s value of 3/4πR and decreases as a quarter of circle to  zero at the value 3/4πR+R/2.
The progress for the two opposite symmetrical processes is:

Polar two-processes amplitude as a function of evolution for a unitary radius circle.

which repeats itself indefinitely radially rotating clockwisee, where the beginning of a process coincides with the other's maximum.
The recursion may be displayed also by drawing in a linear way the shapes of the opposite processes:

that seems a wave, though it is not since not sinusoidal but composed by alternate semicircles.

• System border: closure

The system border is the external circle Cext of radius R, which implies as the system dynamic is of the operational closure type. The two possible directions of rotation - clockwise and counterclockwise - are traditionally, like other symbols such the swastika, associated to a further polar duality - creative if clockwise, destructive if counterclockwise -.

• System matrix

It is represented by the infinite plane external to the symbol and represents, in a necessary metaphorical way, the indescribable and unknowable Tao which the emergent symbol is the Teh:

- 25 -

There was something formless and perfect

before the universe was born.

It is serene. Empty.

Solitary. Unchanging.

Infinite. Eternally present.

It is the mother of the universe.

For lack of a better name,

I call it the Tao.

It flows through all things,

inside and outside, and returns

to the origin of all things.

The Tao is great.

The universe is great.

Earth is great.

Man is great.

These are the four great powers.

Man follows the earth.

Earth follows the universe.

The universe follows the Tao.

The Tao follows only itself.

Tao mapping

The long-distance network of the Macaque monkey brain, spanning the cortex, thalamus, and basal ganglia,
showing 6,602 long-distance connections between 383 brain regions.
from: Dharmendra S. Modha and Raghavendra Singh,
"Network architecture of the long-distance pathways in the macaque brain", PNAS vol. 107 no. 30, 2010

Abstract

Understanding the network structure of white matter communication pathways is essential for unraveling the mysteries of the brain’s function, organization, and evolution. To this end, we derive a unique network incorporating 410 anatomical tracing studies of the macaque brain from the Collation of Connectivity data on the Macaque brain (CoCoMac) neuroinformatic database. Our network consists of 383 hierarchically organized regions spanning cortex, thalamus, and basal ganglia; models the presence of 6,602 directed long-distance connections; is three times larger than any previously derived brain network; and contains subnetworks corresponding to classic corticocortical, corticosubcortical, and subcortico-subcortical fiber systems. We found that the empirical degree distribution of the network is consistent with the hypothesis of the maximum entropy exponential distribution and discovered two remarkable bridges between the brain’s structure and function via networktheoretical analysis. First, prefrontal cortex contains a disproportionate share of topologically central regions. Second, there exists a tightly integrated core circuit, spanning parts of premotor cortex, prefrontal cortex, temporal lobe, parietal lobe, thalamus, basal ganglia, cingulate cortex, insula, and visual cortex, that includes much of the task-positive and task-negative networks and might play a special role in higher cognition and consciousness.

“We have successfully uncovered and mapped the most comprehensive long-distance network of the Macaque monkey brain, which is essential for understanding the brain’s behavior, complexity, dynamics and computation,” Dr. Modha says. “We can now gain unprecedented insight into how information travels and is processed across the brain.

“We have collated a comprehensive, consistent, concise, coherent, and colossal network spanning the entire brain and grounded in anatomical tracing studies that is a stepping stone to both fundamental and applied research in neuroscience and cognitive computing.”

They focused on the long-distance network of 383 brain regions and 6,602 long-distance brain connections that travel through the brain’s white matter, which are like the “interstate highways” between far-flung brain regions, he explained, while short-distance gray matter connections (based on neurons) constitute “local roads” within a brain region and its sub-structures.

Their research builds upon a publicly available database called Collation of Connectivity data on the Macaque brain (CoCoMac), which compiles anatomical tracing data from over 400 scientific reports from neuroanatomists published over the last half-century.

“We studied four times the number of brain regions and have compiled nearly three times the number of connections when compared to the largest previous endeavor,” he pointed out. “Our data may open up entirely new ways of analyzing, understanding, and, eventually, imitating the network architecture of the brain, which according to Marian C. Diamond and Arnold B. Scheibel is “the most complex mass of protoplasm on earth—perhaps even in our galaxy.”

The brain network they found contains a “tightly integrated core that might be at the heart of higher cognition and even consciousness … and may be a key to the age-old question of how the mind arises from the brain.” The core spans parts of premotor cortex, prefrontal cortex, temporal lobe, parietal lobe, thalamus, basal ganglia, cingulate cortex, insula, and visual cortex.

Innermost core for the undirected version of our network. The innermost core is a central subnetwork that is far more tightly integrated than the overall network. Information likely spreads more swiftly within the innermost core than through the overall network, the overall network communicates with itself mainly through the innermost core, and the innermost core contains major components of the task-positive and task-negative networks derived via functional imaging research.

meta-Tao tubes

The second metapattern introduced by Tyler Volk and Jeff Bloom are tubes, structures with linear/lineal shape.

Neuronic pattern.

Background

As physical forms, tubes seem to have three fundamental aspects, which, in some cases, appear as one aspect and, in other cases, are combined in one form. One aspect involves the notion of strength and support along a linear dimension. The second aspect is that of bidirectional or unidirectional transport of energy, materials, or information. The third aspect involves the ability to penetrate, extend, or grow along a linear dimension. In biological forms, they increase the surface area to volume ratio, compared to spheres. In a more general sense, tubes involve the concepts of linear strength, linearity, extension or bridging, transfer or flow of information, and connection or relationship.

Jeroen Anthoniszoon van Aken, called Hieronymus Bosch,
Ascent of the Blessed, 1490-1516, Palazzo Ducale, Venezia

Examples

• In science: nerve cells and fibers, blood vessels, appendage and some other bones, branches, hair, cilia, flagella, digestive tract, streams and rivers, lava tubes, pine needles, eels, snakes, worms, spider webs (tubes making sheet), bodies of airplanes, rockets, etc.
• In architecture and design: hallways, internal support structures, elevator shafts and stairwells, highways, trails, tunnels, bridges, electrical wires, pipes, networking cables, utility poles, suspension bridge (traffic flow, support structures, support cables), etc.
• In art: shape, brushes, pottery forms, sculpting forms, etc.
• In social sciences: relationships between people, connecting lines in concept maps, patterns of interaction, lines of communication, patterns of movement, support mechanisms, etc.
• In other senses: tobacco pipes, cigars, syringes and needles, etc.

Facebook network patterns of interaction.

 

 

 

Metapatterns

The Pattern Underground

Tao without Self

© Igor Morski

Following the Abhidhamma analysis of the five aggregates of subjective experience, the search for a Self come out empty handed, with the following consequences for cognitive sciences:

The Aggregates without a Self

It might appear that in our search for a self in the aggregates we have come out empty handed. Everything that we tried to grasp seemed to slip through our fingers, leaving us with the sense that there is nothing to hold on to. At this point, it is important to pause and again remind ourselves of just what it was that we were unable to find.

We did not fail to find the physical body, though we had to admit that its designation as my body depends very much on how we choose to look at things. Nor did we fail to locate our feelings or sensations, and we also found our various perceptions. We found dispositions, volitions, motivations-in short, all those things that make up our personality and emotional sense of self. We also found all the various forms in which we can be aware-awareness of seeing and hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, even awareness of our own thought processes. So the only thing we didn't find was a truly existing self or ego. But notice that we did find experience. Indeed, we entered the very eye of the storm of experience, we just simply could discern there no self, no "I."

Why then do we feel empty handed? We feel this way because we tried to grasp something that was never there in the first place. This grasping goes on all the time; it is exactly the deep-rooted emotional response that conditions all of our behavior and shapes all of the situations in which we live. It is for this reason that the five aggregates are glossed as the "aggregates of grasping" (upadanaskandha). We – that is, our personality, which is largely dispositional formations-cling to the aggregates as if they were the self when, in fact, they are empty (sunya) of a self. And yet despite this emptiness of ego-self, the aggregates are full of experience. How is this possible?

The progressive development of insight enhances the experience of calm mindfulness and expands the space within which all experiential arisings occur. As this practice develops, one's immediate attitude (not simply one's after-the-fact reflections) becomes more and more focused on the awareness that these experiences - thoughts, dispositions, perceptions, feelings, and sensations - cannot be pinned down. Our habitual clinging to them is itself only another feeling, another disposition of our mind.

This arising and subsiding, emergence and decay, is just that emptiness of self in the aggregates of experience. In other words, the very fact that the aggregates are full of experience is the same as the fact that they are empty of self. If there were a solid, really existing self hidden in or behind the aggregates, its unchangeableness would prevent any experience from occurring; its static nature would make the constant arising and subsiding of experience come to a screeching halt. (It is not surprising, therefore, that techniques of meditation that presuppose the existence of such a self proceed by closing off the senses and denying the world of experience.) But that circle of arising and decay of experience turns continuously, and it can do so only because it is empty of a self.

We have seen not only that cognition and experience do not appear to have a truly existing self but also that the habitual belief in such an ego-self, the continual grasping to such a self, is the basis of the origin and continuation of human suffering and habitual patterns. In our culture, science has contributed to the awakening of this sense of the lack of a fixed self but has only described it from afar. Science has shown us that a fixed self is not necessary for mind but has not provided any way of dealing with the basic fact that this no-longer-needed self is precisely the ego-self that everyone clings to and holds most dear. By remaining at the level of description, science has yet to awaken to the idea that the experience of mind, not merely without some impersonal, hypothetical, and theoretically constructed self but without ego-self, can be profoundly transformative.

Perhaps it is not fair to ask more of science. To borrow the words of Merleau-Ponty, the strength of science may lie precisely in the fact that it gives up living among things, preferring to manipulate them instead. But if this preference expresses the strength of science, it also indicates its weakness. By renouncing a life amid the things of experience, the scientist is able to remain relatively unaffected by her discoveries. This situation has, perhaps, been tolerable for the past three hundred years, but it is fast becoming intolerable in our modem era of cognitive science.

If science is to continue to maintain its position of de facto authority in a responsible and enlightened manner, then it must enlarge its horizon to include mindful, open-ended analyses of experience, such as the one evoked here. Cognitivism, at least at the moment, does not seem to be capable of such a step, given its narrow conception of cognition as the computation of symbols after the fashion of deductive logic. It would do well to remember, then, that cognitivism did not emerge ready made, like Athena from the head of Zeus. Only a few of its exponents are sensitive to its roots in its earlier years and to the decisions that were subsequently made about which avenues of research to explore. These earlier years, however, have once more become a source of inspiration to a new and controversial approach to cognition in which the self-organizing qualities of biological aggregates play a central role. This approach sheds new light on all of the themes we have touched so far and takes us into next part of our exploration.

the Tao of programming: Book 3 - Design

Geoffrey James, 1987

Book 3 - Design

Thus spake the master programmer:

“When the program is being tested, it is too late to make design changes.”

3.1

There once was a man who went to a computer trade show. Each day as he entered, the man told the guard at the door:

“I am a great thief, renowned for my feats of shoplifting. Be forewarned, for this trade show shall not escape unplundered.”

This speech disturbed the guard greatly, because there were millions of dollars of computer equipment inside, so he watched the man carefully. But the man merely wandered from booth to booth, humming quietly to himself. 

When the man left, the guard took him aside and searched his clothes, but nothing was to be found.

On the next day of the trade show, the man returned and chided the guard saying: “I escaped with a vast booty yesterday, but today will be even better.” So the guard watched him ever more closely, but to no avail.

On the final day of the trade show, the guard could restrain his curiosity no longer. “Sir Thief,” he said, “I am so perplexed, I cannot live in peace. Please enlighten me. What is it that you are stealing?”

The man smiled. “I am stealing ideas”, he said.

3.2

There once was a master programmer who wrote unstructured programs. A novice programmer, seeking to imitate him, also began to write unstructured programs. When the novice asked the master to evaluate his progress, the master criticized him for writing unstructured programs, saying: “What is appropriate for the master is not appropriate for the novice. You must understand the Tao before transcending structure.”

3.3

There was once a programmer who was attached to the court of the warlord of Wu. The warlord asked the programmer: “Which is easier to design: an accounting package or an operating system?”

“An operating system”, replied the programmer.

The warlord uttered an exclamation of disbelief. “Surely an accounting package is trivial next to the complexity of an operating system”, he said.

“Not so”, said the programmer, “when designing an accounting package, the programmer operates as a mediator between people having different ideas: how it must operate, how its reports must appear, and how it must conform to the tax laws. By contrast, an operating system is not limited by outside appearances. When designing an operating system, the programmer seeks the simplest harmony between machine and ideas. This is why an operating system is easier to design.”

The warlord of Wu nodded and smiled. “That is all good and well, but which is easier to debug?”

The programmer made no reply.

3.4

A manager went to the master programmer and showed him the requirements document for a new application. The manager asked the master: “How long will it take to design this system if I assign five programmers to it?”

“It will take one year”, said the master promptly.

“But we need this system immediately or even sooner! How long will it take if I assign ten programmers to it?”

The master programmer frowned. “In that case, it will take two years.”

“And what if I assign a hundred programmers to it?”

The master programmer shrugged. “Then the design will never be completed”, he said.